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I.

INTRODUCTION

The compensation of chief executive officers (“CEOs”) and other top business
executives has soared in recent years. The rise is huge in both absolute and relative terms. For the CEO of a large company, pay went from about one hundred
forty times the pay of an average worker in 1991 to about five hundred times the
pay only twelve years later.1 There has been much debate among scholars and in
the political realm as to why the increase has happened, whether it is a negative
occurrence, and what, if anything, we might do to address the matter.
Some do not believe that the increase in compensation is a problem. My
concern here, though, is mainly with those who do believe that there is a serious
problem. Within that group, there are at least two very different types of concerns that lead to two very dissimilar goals for proposals to reform executive
compensation. One concern focuses on executive compensation as a problem that
both reflects and exacerbates poor corporate governance.2 The other concern focuses on executive compensation as a source of increasing economic, political, and
social inequality.3 The purpose of this essay is to briefly compare and contrast
these two different concerns and to evaluate some arguments that claim that corporate governance, but not equality, should be important when considering
whether and how to reform executive compensation. I suggest that corporate law
scholars do not have a good basis for completely ignoring inequality as a major
social concern. I believe that reducing inequality is an important social goal and
advocate using policies that attempt to reduce inequality to help guide our regulation of executive compensation.
Most corporate law scholars hold concerns about corporate governance as a
higher priority than general inequality. Lucian Bebchuk, a professor of law at
Harvard Law School, and Jesse Fried, a professor of law at the University of
California, Berkeley, make this quite clear in their book Pay Without Performance, the leading statement in contemporary legal scholarship for the position
that executive compensation is in need of serious reform:
To begin, there is the “moral,” “fairness-based”—and, some might
say, “populist”—opposition to large amounts of pay. In this view, putting aside practical consequences, paying executives hundreds of times
what other employees get is inherently unfair and unacceptable.
Our own criticism does not come from this perspective. Our approach is completely pragmatic and consequentialist, focusing on shareholder value and the performance of corporations (and, in turn, the
economy as a whole). We would accept compensation at current or even

1.

LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004).

2.

See infra Part II.

3.

See infra Part III.
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higher levels as long as such compensation, through its incentive effects,
actually serves shareholders.4

Thus, for Bebchuk and Fried, the sheer size of executive compensation is not
necessarily a problem. The problem arises when that compensation is designed in
ways that grants substantial amounts of shareholder money to executives without
giving them appropriate incentives to increase shareholder value. In their view,
it is quite possible that a properly designed system would give executives even
higher average compensation for the greater risk that might flow from a system
that more effectively serves shareholders’ financial interests.
In contrast, it seems that the political attention that executive compensation
is receiving recently is driven in part by a concern over growing economic and
social inequality in the United States. In the last several decades, inequality in
income and wealth in this country has increased dramatically.5 Rich CEOs have
become poster boys for this problem.6 This trend may be a part of the motivation
underlying proposed legislation in Congress to require an advisory shareholder
vote on executive compensation.7
In Part II, I briefly consider some ways in which these two concerns regarding corporation governance and inequality overlap, but note that ultimately they
may differ significantly in many circumstances. The next two parts then consider
two arguments in favor of the scholars’ position of focusing only on the corporate
governance concern while ignoring the effects of compensation on general inequality. Part III presents the leading argument among law and economics scholars for concentrating only on economic efficiency when applying legal rules. This
argument states that we should set most laws at their efficient level, then achieve
the redistribution of income and wealth that we desire through tax and transfer
policies. I argue that this strategy does not take into account political constraints
that may block that implementation of policy. Aiming to reduce executive compensation may be a more politically feasible way of reducing inequality and is
worth pursuing for that reason.
Part IV presents a different argument for focusing only on the corporate
governance concern. According to this argument, executive compensation only
accounts for a very small part of the growth in general inequality. Even if it is
appropriate to use legal rules to try to reduce inequality, using executive compensation rules for that purpose is ineffective because executive compensation is just
too small a part of the problem. I am more agnostic about this argument, but I
4.

BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 8.

5.

See David H. Autor et al., Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Re-assessing the Revisionists 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11627, 2005); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2003).

6.

See Autor, supra note 5; see also Piketty & Saez, supra note 5.

7.

See The Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/ExecutiveCompensation.html.
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am inclined to believe that this reasoning should not block positing reduced inequality as a goal of executive compensation regulation. There is certainly some
evidence in support of this argument against targeting inequality through executive compensation, but I also consider some counter evidence and argue that we
need more thorough and varied empirical inquiries into what role executive compensation has played in the growth of inequality in the United States. Overall,
reforming executive compensation seems likely to be a moderately important part
of a broader strategy of reducing inequality in the United States. Thus, I conclude that neither of the two positions analyzed in this article should dissuade us
from pursuing reduced inequality as one of the guiding goals of executive compensation regulation.
II.

OVERLAPS AND DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO APPROACHES

There is certainly some overlap between the two different concerns about
executive compensation. The sheer size of executive compensation and its extremely rapid growth are red flags for those who advocate for corporate governance.8 The size suggests strong motivation for executives to try to bend
compensation in their favor, and it is hard to believe that the huge growth in
compensation levels has been accompanied by an equal growth in the effectiveness
of top executives. It is certainly possible that changes focused on improving corporate governance will lead to lower average compensation for top executives.
To the extent that is true, those concerned with increased inequality can applaud
such changes. However, it is also possible that changes motivated by corporate
governance concerns could lead to increased compensation. In that case, the two
basic concerns will diverge.
There is also a more subtle reason why corporate governance mavens may
want to consider growing inequality as a problem. Increased inequality may
matter to various corporate constituencies, particularly to employees. Resentment
over executive compensation may sap worker motivation, leading to poorer performance, and ultimately lowering profits.9 However, it is unclear how far that
effect goes in tying together divergent concerns over inequality and corporate
governance. First, there is currently little systematic evidence that resentment of
high CEO pay significantly affects employee performance. Moreover, even if
there is such a negative effect, it could be outweighed by possible positive effects
on profitability of high but well-designed executive pay.
Another line of reasoning can connect governance and inequality concerns in
a different way. Many people who are concerned about increased inequality may
not object to inequality per se, but rather only to inequality that is improper.
8.

See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1.

9.

For an example of employee resentment of CEO compensation, see James Parks, CEO Compensation: A
Year’s Pay for a Day’s Work, Aug. 29, 2007, http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/08/29/ceo-compensation-ayears-pay-for-a-days-work.
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One reason to care about equality is a concern for fairness: People should be paid
what they deserve for their efforts and no more. Certainly, a part of the concern
over rising executive pay is the sense that CEOs have not really earned this
increase.10 If one could show convincingly, however, that CEOs have indeed
dramatically increased the value created by their companies, then the increase in
inequality might be seen as justified.11
On the other hand, the link between governance and inequality concerns is
also limited. A concern with just desserts is not the only reason that many people
care about growing economic, political, and social inequality. General moral
sense about what top officers deserve to earn may not completely overlap with
what compensation package gives those officers incentives to increase shareholder
value. Moreover, even if one believes that CEOs have earned their higher pay,
one might find the resulting increased inequality disturbing for other reasons.
Therefore, it is a tough empirical question to determine how much the concerns about governance and inequality converge and how much they diverge.
Advocates of each position may find that they can unite on many matters supporting or opposing specific measures. However, it is also probable that the two
concerns will point in different directions regarding some proposals. Thus, it is
useful to try to sort out whether we should be guided by corporate governance
concerns, inequality concerns, or both in addressing potential executive compensation reforms. The next two parts consider two different arguments for why we
should not care about the effect of executive pay on general inequality as we
weigh potential reforms of executive compensation.
III.

ARE TAXES AND TRANSFERS THE BEST MEANS TO ADDRESS INEQUALITY?

The first argument against reducing inequality as a goal in executive compensation reform is a general one and applies to all areas of legal regulation.
Law and economics scholars generally concern themselves only with economic efficiency when they evaluate legal rules.12 A variety of justifications for this approach are available, but the leading one states that we should address inequality
only through tax and transfer policy.13 I argue that this reasoning is wrong, both
in general and as applied to executive compensation regulation.
10. See Nanette Byrnes & Jane Sasseen, Board of Hard Knocks, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 22, 2007, at 37;

SEC Shoves Executive Pay into the Spotlight, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 22, 2006, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/investor/content/aug2006/pi20060822_357187.htm?chan=search. But see
Charles M. Yablon, Essay: Bonus Questions – Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 273 (1999) (positing that executives did not deserve high rates
of compensation in 1990, but that CEOs obtained extremely good results for their shareholders in the late
1990s, making their multi-million dollar bonuses seem justifiable).
11. See Guillermina Jasso & Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom, Distributive Justice and CEO Compensation,

(2006), http://www.meyersson.com/Jasso&Meyersson-CEO-DJ-2006-08-31.pdf.
12. See R OBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 4 (3d ed. 2000).
13. Id. at 111–12 .
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The classic version of this argument is the Second Fundamental Theorem of
Welfare Economics. According to the theorem, any desired Pareto efficient outcome can be achieved through first redistributing income through lump sum taxes
and transfers, and then allowing production and exchange to reach a competitive
equilibrium.14 The fundamental theorem applies only in a “first-best” world
where the economy has no imperfections that prevent an efficient competitive
equilibrium from emerging.15 That is not the real world, so the fundamental
theorem is of limited use for practical policymaking.
However, Harvard Law School professors, Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, have replicated a variant of the theorem within a “second-best” framework. Given certain assumptions, they show that it is more efficient to achieve
desired distribution effects solely through tax and transfer policies, even where
those policies introduce distortions, rather than setting other legal rules at inefficient levels in order to achieve some desired redistribution.16 The basic idea is
that using non-tax policies to redistribute income introduces additional distortions that can be avoided if we use only tax policy to redistribute.17 If this argument is correct, then a specific application of it is that we should not use corporate
law or securities law to attempt to redistribute income away from corporate officers. Rather, we should set whatever rules best maximize the efficiency of corporate governance, and if those rules lead to undesirable income distribution,
then address it through the tax system.
Chris Sanchirico, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
has already given good reason to suspect that the assumptions underlying Kaplow
and Shavell’s argument are not generally accurate, and that their result does not
hold under more general assumptions.18 Here, though, I shall consider a different
14. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 220–21 (1st ed. 1978). Pareto efficiency is a concept in

economics to determine the efficiency of actions in the market. “Pareto efficiency means that no one can be
made better off without someone becoming worse off.” Intelligent Design, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9988840; see also Marvelous
Markets; The Perfect Firm; So What?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 1986, at 84 (“A fully competitive market
system is, as economists are fond of saying, ‘optimal.’ Vilfredo Pareto defined the idea early this century.
He showed that, on certain assumptions, a free-market economy will allocate resources in such an efficient
way that it is then impossible to make somebody better off without making somebody worse off.”).
15. See generally VARIAN, supra note 14, at 153–55.
16. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of

Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal
Taxation?, 71. AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981).
17. See sources cited supra note 16.
18. Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003

(2001); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000) (arguing that a general second-best world redistribution is
most efficiently achieved with a mix of policy and rules).
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critique of the Kaplow and Shavell position, one which I have developed briefly
in several articles.19 There are political limits to how much redistribution we can
accomplish through tax policy.20 Further redistribution through other legal rules
may be more politically possible. This may be because the non-tax rules are set by
different policymakers who are more willing to consider redistribution or because
popular sentiment is more inclined to accept fairness arguments in the non-tax
rules.
We may be at such a moment in the case of executive compensation. Much
popular attention and disapproval is now focused on increasingly high executive
pay.21 People think something should be done about it, and politicians feel some
pressure to respond or may see political gain to be had by doing so. Deflecting
this pressure to more general tax reform would probably dilute it to a point
where it no longer had much political impact. Redistribution is always politically
difficult—the rich are generally able to defend their interests well. Thus, if popular sentiment makes some redistribution politically possible, we (those of us, that
is, who believe that some redistribution is currently desirable) should not pass up
the chance because we think that other measures would do a better job of redistributing, especially if those other measures are not currently politically feasible.
The best can be the enemy of the good.
This political feasibility point can be pushed a step further. Some legal rules
affect the distribution of political power.22 As such, they affect the political feasibility of future policies, including the possibility of income redistribution. In setting such rules, we should take their political impact into account. The rules of
corporate governance may be an important instance of such rules.23 The officers
and directors of large corporations have much political power at their control.24
They can and do use that power to advance a variety of interests, including their
corporations’ interests, their class interests, and their own personal interests. Any
serious attempt to take income away from the very rich is not particularly likely
to succeed in a system where politicians are heavily indebted to large corporate
givers, and those large corporate givers are in turn run by people who do not like
19. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Economists’ New Arguments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 86, 111 (2003); Brett

H. McDonnell & Daniel A. Farber, Are Efficient Antitrust Rules Always Optimal?, 48 ANTITRUST
BULL. 807, 825 (2003); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 GEO. L. J. 2071 (1996).
20. See Giacomo Corneo & Hans Peter Grüner, Social Limits to Redistribution, 90 AM. ECON. REV.

1491, 1493 (2000) (“In the model more inequality, as measured by the difference between the wealth of
the rich and that of the poor, tends to lower the extent of redistribution desired by the middle class.”).
21. See , e.g., Joe Nocera, What if C.E.O. Pay is Fair?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at C1.
22. See Corneo & Grüner, supra note 20, at 1491–93.
23. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, Or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work,

STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=878790 (discussing the
disparity between perceived influence of shareholders in corporations and their actual influence).
24. Id. at 22.
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attempts at large-scale redistribution.25 Thus, corporate governance rules, which
limit the ability of officers and directors to use corporate resources in ways that do
not directly benefit the corporation, would be potentially quite politically important. Of course, for that very reason they are also hard to enact.
Thus, I am not inclined to accept the Kaplow and Shavell tax and transfer
argument on redistributive policies as a reason for ignoring distributive concerns
in setting the rules governing executive compensation. If there is a political opportunity to enact a new rule of corporate governance that would reduce the
growing inequality that results from higher executive pay and/or that would
limit the ability of corporate managers to use their positions to lobby for rules of
the game that benefit them, it would be worth doing so, even if in theory we
could achieve the same degree of redistribution more cheaply through higher taxes
on the rich. For the moment, measures to limit executive pay may be politically
possible; higher taxes on the rich seem less likely.
IV.

DOES EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON GENERAL

INEQUALITY?

The second argument against using executive compensation regulation to
reduce general income inequality is much more specific to the topic of executive
compensation than the Kaplow and Shavell argument. This argument is that the
large increase in executive compensation at public corporations has been only a
small part of the general increase in income inequality over the last few decades.
Even if we were to completely stop, or even reverse, the growth in the pay of
executives at public corporations, income inequality overall would be changed
very little. This argument garners more empirical support than the one I considered in the previous part, but it is not currently completely persuasive. It may be
that executive compensation is still a fairly important factor in explaining the
general increase in economic inequality. Thus, regulating executive compensation should play a moderately important role in reducing that inequality.
A recent working paper by Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, professors at
the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, lays out the facts for this
second argument against reducing inequality as a goal in regulating executive
compensation quite forcefully.26 They gather evidence from a variety of resources
to try to construct some of the composition of the top 1 percent, 0.5 percent, 0.1
percent, 0.001 percent, and 0.001 percent income brackets.27 Their core finding
is that top executives of non-financial public corporations comprise no more than
5 or 6 percent of any of the top brackets, and that while the percentage of such
25. See generally id.
26. Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the

Highest Incomes? (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 615, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=931280.
27. Id. at 2–4.
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executives in some of these brackets rose modestly between 1994 and 2004, the
increases were not dramatic, and by some measures, the percentages did not increase at all.28 Kaplan and Rauh argue that the managers of hedge funds, venture capital funds, and private equity funds, investment bankers, and lawyers
have played at least an equally important part in the growth of inequality.29
They posit that this group collectively earns much more and composes a significantly larger part of the top income brackets than the top executives of nonfinancial public corporations.30
The Kaplan and Rauh figures suggest rather strongly that public corporation executives are, at most, a relatively modest part of the explosion of income
inequality at the top of the pyramid. As the evidence currently stands, however,
I do not think that they have yet proved that such executives are an insignificant
part of the equation, or that political action aimed at their pay makes no sense.
There are still enough gaps in their reasoning that it could well turn out that
executive pay makes sense as one part, albeit a modest one, in a broader strategy
aimed at reducing inequality.
One gap is that although Kaplan and Rauh consider all of the groups mentioned above (as well as athletes and celebrities), all of these categories combined
compose no more than about a quarter of even the highest income brackets according to their figures. It is a little puzzling to consider who else composes the
remaining three quarters of the wealthiest people in America. Kaplan and Rauh
say their estimates are rather conservative, but doubt that these groups could
explain more than 40 percent of the top categories.31 They point to executives of
privately-held companies, trial lawyers who are not part of the top two hundred
law firms, and independently wealthy individuals as important parts of the
missing rich.32 I find it hard to believe that those groups could explain a big part
of the missing 60 to 75 percent, nor is there any other obvious missing large
group. This discrepancy calls into some question how accurately they have characterized the composition of the top brackets.
Kaplan and Rauh point out that deferred compensation, such as pension
benefits, are not included in the income measure for public corporation executives
that they use.33 Also missing are items such as in-kind perks. These items are a
fairly important part of executive compensation.34 Although these items may also
be missing from the measures they use for other groups, such unreported items are
28. Id. § II.
29. Id. at 1, 4.
30. Id. § III.
31. Id. at 37.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8.
34. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 87–117.
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probably a much larger part of the compensation of public corporation executives
than they are for the compensation of the others. As Bebchuk and Fried argue,
the agency problems within public corporations give rise to strong incentives to
compensate executives in ways that are relatively hidden from public view.35
Additionally, the measure of executive compensation that Kaplan and Rauh
use does not include income that executives earn from investments they have
made outside investments in their own company. The primary measure that
Kaplan and Rauh use considers only compensation received from one’s company
and asks how many executives fall within the extreme high-income tax brackets
based on that compensation alone.36 It is important to note that tax brackets are
based on income received from all sources. Insofar as executives are able to make
large investments only because of previous income they have earned from their
jobs, such income should be included. One measure Kaplan and Rauh present
helps address this question—they recalculate the share of executives in top income
brackets excluding investment income from the calculation for all earners. This
calculation comes closer to comparing apples with apples—it compares the income
that executives receive from their companies with the income all high-earners
receive, excluding income from investment for all groups (both executives and
non-executives). Under this calculation, the share of public corporation executives in the top brackets rises notably, hitting almost 12 percent of the top bracket
under one measure.37
Another reason to give special attention to the executives of large corporations is their special political power.38 Their power does not come simply, or even
mainly, from their personal income. Rather, they harness great power from their
ability to direct the use of the vast resources of the companies that they run.
These resources are a major source of the funding for political lobbying. Insofar
as one cares about economic inequality at least in part because of the effect it has
on political inequality, then public corporation executives should certainly be a
source of special concern.
Despite these caveats, it does seem quite plausible that investment bankers,
the managers of hedge funds and private equity funds, and corporate lawyers are
at least as large a part of the problem of rising inequality as are the top officers of
public corporations. I would think that those who care about limiting inequality
would want to turn their attention to these groups as well. Indeed, they seem to
be doing so, at least in the case of hedge funds.39 I do not think, however, that
the cases of public corporation managers and of hedge fund and private equity
35. Id. at 67–68.
36. See Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 26, at 10–11.
37. Id. at table 1d.
38. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
39. See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.

07-036, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012472.
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managers are as drastically different as Kaplan and Rauh make them out to be.
Private equity managers, like public corporation managers, are responsible for
deciding what to do with large sums of other people’s money. Thus, some of the
special political concerns just mentioned for public company managers also apply
to private equity managers.
Moreover, the agency concerns that apply to public company managers are
also present for private equity and private corporation managers to some extent.
The literature on this subject, for the most part, seems to assume the opposite—
namely, that public corporation managers face a uniquely severe agency problem.40 It is true that the separation of control and ownership that comes with
large numbers of dispersed shareholders does present an especially hard monitoring problem. Nevertheless, variants of the problem still occur with private funds
and companies. A controlling shareholder or partner may take advantage of minority equity holders. Indeed, that is why courts have traditionally been more
likely to find fiduciary duty violations in private company executive compensation cases than public company cases.41 Investors in hedge funds may be rich
themselves, but they still may be foolishly leaving money with inadequately
monitored managers.
Finally, suppose that after further inquiry we decide that the pay of public
company executives does indeed only account for around 5 to 10 percent of the
extreme concentration of wealth at the high end of the income bracket. Does that
mean we should ignore it and instead go after the more important causes of
inequality? Not necessarily; 5 to 10 percent is not chicken feed. If we tackle five
different areas that each contribute 5 to 10 percent to the overall problem and
make real headway with each, we will be well on our way to getting some control
over the growth in inequality in our society. I doubt there will be one magic
bullet that explains the vast portion of the increase in inequality. If public company executive pay is one modestly important cause among many, then addressing it makes sense as part of a larger program of reducing inequality. That is
particularly true if this is one of the causes for which there is the most political
support for taking action, and even more so if some actions here might tilt the
balance of political power so that further action in other areas becomes possible in
the future.
Thus, the empirical role of executive compensation in increased inequality
remains unclear and worth further study.42 In the meantime, though, it does
seem likely that executive compensation will have a modest but notable role to
40. See Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKE-

BUS. L.J. 1, 39 (2004). See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation:
Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187 (2003).

LEY

41. J ESSE H. CHOPER

ET AL.,

CASES

AND

MATERIALS

ON

CORPORATIONS 149 (6th ed. 2004).

42. See Ian Dew-Becker & Robert J. Gordon, Where Did the Productivity Go? Inflation Dynamics and

the Distribution of Income, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67 (2005) (discussing a study
that found that executive compensation played a large role in recent increases in inequality). However,
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play in explaining the increase in inequality, and also a modest but notable role
to play in feasible political strategies to reduce that inequality.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are at least two quite different goals underlying the current focus on
high executive compensation: concern about poor corporate governance and concern about growing inequality. Although advocates who are motivated by differing concerns may still be able to agree on many measures for regulating executive
compensation, sometimes they are likely to disagree. Thus, it is helpful to think
about whether both concerns provide potentially valid reasons for regulation.
In this essay, I have attempted to make one small step in thinking about
that question. Most corporate law scholars seem to care only about corporate
governance, not inequality. This position seems to put them at odds with most
politicians on the issue of executive pay. My inquiry has been whether the scholars are justified in ignoring the effect of corporate pay on inequality. In addressing that question, I have considered two different arguments in favor of ignoring
the inequality concern. Neither of these arguments are frequently articulated in
the corporate law literature. Indeed, the lack of concern with general inequality
is not itself often explicitly articulated; however, it appears to underlie most
scholarship in the area. Thus, even if one believed that neither of the arguments
that I have considered here was correct, one could still choose to ignore the inequality concern for some other reason. I do think, however, that these two arguments are among the very best available to defend the prevailing scholarly
implicit consensus. Hence, I hope to have removed some intellectual roadblocks to
using the reduction of inequality as a goal in regulating executive compensation.
Of the two arguments, I think the first—the broader, more theoretical argument—is the weaker. The Kaplow and Shavell argument for using tax policy
alone to correct for excessive inequality is built on shaky assumptions and ignores
much political reality. There is not much reason to accept it as a general proposition, and in the particular case of executive compensation, it is not very persuasive. The second argument, though, should be of much greater concern for those
tempted to use executive pay regulation to address economic inequality. We still
need better evidence as to how much of a role executive pay has played in growing inequality, but the answer seems to be that its role is fairly modest at most.
Those who really want to tackle growing inequality will have to advance many
other policy reforms as well. Still, regulating executive pay is likely to be a sensible and decently important part of an overall package of reforms.
Of course, in this brief essay, I have done nothing to show why we should
care about inequality as a problem in the first place. I have not even produced
Kaplan and Rauh raise several methodological objections to the Dew-Becker and Gordon article. See
Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 26, at 6.
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evidence to show that inequality has grown significantly in the last few decades;
I have simply assumed this disputed point, although there is plenty of evidence
for it.43 Even assuming inequality exists and that we should want to reduce it, I
have not showed that the benefits of doing so exceed the costs of any particular
reform proposal. Nor have I laid out what different policy proposals might follow for executive compensation were we to take reducing inequality seriously as
an important goal in this area. Others have addressed those points elsewhere.
My limited task here has been to consider whether either of the two arguments
presented in this essay can justify ignoring inequality as a concern in regulating
executive compensation. My provisional answer is no. If corporate law scholars
want to continue ignoring reduced inequality as a goal, they should devote more
effort to defending that choice. Better still, they should accept reducing inequality
as a legitimate and important goal in our efforts to regulate executive
compensation.

43. See generally Autor, supra note 5; Piketty & Saez, supra note 5.
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